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I. American Practice
The United States prides itself that under its judicial system no one
is considered guilty until he has been convicted of a criminal act. As far
as the infliction of punishment in the technical sense (fine, imprison-
ment, capital punishment, loss of certain civil rights) is concerned it is
true that conviction in a judicial proceeding is a prerequisite, but this is
not the whole picture.
On principle, criminal proceedings in this country begin with an ar-
rest,' generally supplemented by fingerprinting and photographing. The
fact that in many cases actual physical restriction or confinement is soon
lifted by some type of bail does not alter the fact that the person has
been arrested.
It is not our purpose here to determine why criminal proceedings still
as a rule start with the harsh, and in itself degrading, measure of physi-
cal arrest, even when only a minor violation of law is involved. Possibly
an important reason is the lack of reliable records of changes in a
person's residence which would make it easier to locate him for the
further steps in the criminal proceeding. The American people would
not readily submit to a system used frequently in Europe under which
every change of residence is to be reported to the police of both the old
and the new residence, indicating both places of residence so that it
becomes fairly easy to follow the movements of every person
Be this as it may, the fact that arrest is such a universal occurrence
*Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; J.U.D. University of Breslau,
1921; J.D. University of Genoa, 1934.
'in recent times some mitigation of this principle can be observed. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-20
reads in part: "In all cases of misdemeanor any officer authorized by law to issue warrants in
criminal actions may issue a summons instead of a warrant of arrest when he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person accused will appear in response to the same." Still, a warrant
will have to be issued before the trial. RoY G. HALL, JR., THE LAW OF ARREST, 13 (2d ed., 1961).
A citation that may be issued under Georgia law for vehicle violations is still defined as arrest in
the headline of that section. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-222 (1972).
2This does not mean that in the United States there do not exist other methods which can have,
at least to a certain degree, the same effect. The evergrowing use of the Social Security account
number in matters of federal or state taxation, in Medicare or private health insurance, on drivers'
licenses, on identification cards of universities, libraries, etc. can be an important clue for tracing
a person's whereabouts. The technicalities connected with the European system mentioned in the
text are quite simple, so that their fulfillment does not amount to any considerable burden.
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in criminal proceedings results in an enormous number of arrests3 with
an inordinately low ratio between arrests and convictions., One would
expect that these two aspects of arrests in the United States should have
the effect that little, if any, importance is attributed to the mere fact of
having been arrested. Actually, the opposite is true. This is demon-
strated by a rather recent but not atypical Georgia statute that obliges
law enforcement agencies to place all arrest information on appropriate
records which shall be open for public inspection.' The statute does not
provide for the disposition of the case to be added to the record.
Even where no such broad statutes regarding public availability of
every arrest record exist the situation is not very different. Ever since
1939 the Attorney General of the United States has been under the
statutory duty to "(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identifica-
tion, criminal identification, crime, and other records; and (2) exchange
these records with and for the official use of, authorized officials of the
Federal Government, the States, cities and penal and other institu-
tions." 6 To carry out this duty the Attorney General has issued the
following regulation:
Subject to the supervision and direction of the Attorney General, the
director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall: ...(b) Conduct
the acquisition, collection, exchange, classification and preservation of
identification records, including personal fingerprints voluntarily sub-
'in 1968 the FBI had in its criminal files more than 54 million arrest records. FBI,
COOPERATION, THE BACKBONE OF EFFECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT 12 (1968); the number of
arrests made in 1965 alone as listed by the FBI was over 5,030,000. 1965 FBI UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS table 21 at 112 (1966). It was believed in 1967 that "about 40 per cent of the male children
living in the United States today will be arrested for non-traffic offense some time in their lives"
and that "the proportion is even higher for boys living in a city." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
247 (1967).
'One has only to think of dragnet arrests, of mass arrests in connection with control of riots or
of the many unjustified arrests for disorderly conduct. In 1958, some high ranking police officers
expressed their conviction that more than 75% of all arrests were made illegally. M. HOUTS, FROM
ARREST TO RELEASE 24 (1958).
'GA. CODE ANN. § 27-220 (1972), based on this statute, reads:
It shall be the duty of all sheriffs, chiefs of police, and the heads of any other State
law enforcement agencies to obtain or cause to be obtained, the name, address and age
of all persons arrested by law enforcement officers under the supervision of such sheriffs,
chiefs of police or other State law enforcement agencies, when any such person is
charged with an offense against the laws of Georgia or any other state of the United
States. Such information shall be placed on appropriate records which each of such law
enforcement agencies shall maintain, and such records shall be open for public inspection
unless otherwise provided by law.
The only exception from the duty to maintain arrest records open to the public appears to be the
provision in GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3502 (1972), referring to the arrest of juveniles.
'28 U.C.C. § 534(a) (1970).
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mitted, on a mutual beneficial basis, from law enforcement and other
governmental agencies, insurance companies, railroad police, national
banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC-Reserve-
Insured Banks, and banking institutions insured by the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation; provide expert testimony in
Federal or local courts as to fingerprint examinations; and provide
identification assistance in disasters and in missing persons type cases
including those from insurance companies.7
The full impact of this system can be understood only if Executive
Order No. 104508 is also considered. The gist of this lengthy order is to
be found in its section 3(a) which reads in part:
The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any depart-
ment or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investiga-
tion. The scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first
instance according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the
position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature
of the position, on the national security, but in no event shall the
investigation include less than a national agency check (including a
check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
and written inquiries to appropriate local law enforcement agencies,
former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by
the person under investigation . . .
In the recent case of Menard v. MitchelP the workings of the system
in practice were ably described by the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.'0 The case involved a suit to compel the Attor-
728 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1971).
'Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 72 (Supp. 1953), 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1970).
'Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971).
'
0ld. at 721-23:
The FBI Identification Division has some two hundred million sets of fingerprints on
file. These records are maintained in separate criminal and applicant files. Fingerprints
are submitted to the Bureau by federal, state, and local agencies on a reciprocal basis.
Law enforcement agencies, primarily local police and sheriffs offices submit prints of
arrested persons in order to receive information on the person's prior criminal involve-
ment. The Bureau reports its findings and maintains the fingerprint card so submitted,
along with the accompanying arrest data, in its criminal file. Information on the subse-
quent disposition of each arrest is posted if received from the submitting agency. The
information so recorded is cryptic and formal, without explanation or elaboration.
Juvenile arrests and convictions, when submitted by local agencies, are treated the same
as similar adult data. The criminal file currently contains information on some sixty
million arrests of approximately nineteen million people.
Fingerprint cards are also received from agencies of the state and federal governments
and others who seek information on an individual's record of criminal involvement in
connection with permits, licenses and employment clearance. After check [sic] against
the criminal file, cards are maintained in the applicants file for future reference. The
[Vol. 4: 116
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ney General and the Director of the FBI to remove from Bureau identi-
fication files plaintiffs fingerprints and accompanying notations regard-
ing his arrest and detention which were not followed by further prosecu-
Division also receives hundreds of "name check" requests from contributing and non-
contributing sources, including an occasional Congressman, asking for the criminal
record of an individual by name without submitting any fingerprints for compari-
son . ..
The volume of work of the Division is enormous, requiring about 3,300 employees.
The Division receives an average of 29,000 fingerprints a day for processing, of which
about 13,000 are received from law enforcing agencies in connection with arrests.
The Division, broadly speaking, considers any state, city or county official to be
authorized to receive information if the agency has something to do with law enforce-
ment or if it is authorized by statute, ordinance, or rule to fingerprint applicants for
employment or for a permit or license. . . . The Division maintains a current list of
contributing or participating state and federal agencies which now numbers between
7,000 and 8,000. Of these, approximately 3,750 are local police departments and sheriff
offices. Criminal record data is not sent directly to private employers, except in a few
instances such as 390 banks insured by the F.D.I.C. and certain hospitals. ...
Given the very general nature of its purported authority the Bureau has proceeded
cautiously. It investigates the authority of local agencies to require fingerprints and
insists that detailed forms be filled out by contributors showing the purpose for which
fingerprints are to be submitted. The Attorney General advises in doubtful situations.
The Division has carried out its work in a responsible, meticulous manner. Nonetheless,
the end result is most unsatisfactory. While the Division has vigorously sought to develop
complete records and particularly to learn of dispositions resulting from each arrest, this
effort has not been successful due to the failure of arresting agencies to send in follow-
up data on forms provided. Some police departments do much better than others in this
regard, but the Division has no sanctions and must be satisfied with what it can get by
persuasion since the whole system functions on a voluntary basis. Even more trouble-
some is the fact that the Division has little opportunity to supervise what is actually done
with the arrest records it disseminates. It requires that a proper purpose be stated by
the agency requesting information but what is in fact done with the information as a
practical matter cannot be constantly checked. It is apparent that local agencies may
on occasion pass on arrest information to private employers. The Division makes no
regular inspection to prevent this, for it has neither funds nor sanctions, and accordingly
responds only to complaints. In a few instances police departments have been restricted,
and in other instances when complaints were received personnel or administrative
changes were demanded by the FBI and put into effect.
Any agency that forward [sic] fingerprint arrest data to the Division may request the
Bureau to remove the data from the file and return it. This the Bureau does automati-
cally, retaining no copies and without inquiring as to the reasons underlying the request.
Thus control of what arrest or criminal data remain in the files rests in every case (except
where an arrest on Federal charges is involved) with the local arresting authority. In
1970 over 8,000 arrest records were returned by the FBI to local authorities. Some
thirteen states, including California, have laws or procedures for authorizing this form
of expungement in various circumstances. In addition some states have laws limiting the
type of arrest data that can be forwarded routinely to the Bureau.
Regarding some later development in the crime reporting system see text accompanying note 56,
infra.
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tion by California police. On defendants' motion summary judgment
had been granted by the District Court; on appeal it was reversed" and
the case remanded to the District Court which then rendered the quoted
decision.
In its opinion the Court of Appeals ably described the consequences
of an arrest record:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes known, may
subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct economic
loss is involved, the injury to an individual's reputation may be sub-
stantial. Economic losses themselves may be both direct and serious.
Opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licenses may
be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the mere fact of an
arrest, even if followed by acquittal or complete exoneration of the
charges involved. An arrest record may be used by the police in deter-
mining whether subsequently to arrest the individual concerned or
whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges against an
individual already arrested. Arrest records have been used in deciding
whether to allow a defendant to present his story without impeachment
by prior convictions, and as a basis for denying release prior to trial
or an appeal; or they may be considered by a judge in determining the
sentence to be given a convicted offender.'
2
The logical sequence of the whole problem was summed up by the court
in these words:
Adverse action taken against an individual because of his arrest record
is premised upon certain assumptions regarding the meaning of an
arrest. Insofar as these assumptions differ from reality, the adverse
actions will have an erroneous basis. 13
On remand the District Court found that the arrest was made with
probable cause, regardless of subsequent failure to establish plaintiff's
involvement in any crime, and refused to order the record expunged.
"Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
'
2ld. at 490 n.17. The court gave these details about the economic disadvantages resulting from
an arrest record: "A survey by the New York Civil Liberties Union indicated that 75% of New
York area employment agencies would not accept for referral an applicant with an arrest record.
SPARER, EMPLOYABILITY AND THE JUVENILE ARREST RECORD 5 (Center for Study of Unemployed
Youth, New York University) (pamphlet). Another survey of 75 employers indicated that 66 of
them would not consider employing a man who had been arrested for assault and acquitted.
Schwartz and Skolnik, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc. PROB. 133 (1962). At the very least,
an arrest record is likely to lead to further investigation; and if it is convenient to fill the job before
the investigation is complete, the applicant is effectively denied employment because of his record.
See Hess and Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 494, 496 (1967)."
11430 F.2d at 491.
[Vol. 4: 116
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Nevertheless, it did order restrictions on its use: "His arrest record may
not be revealed toL prospective employers except in the case of any
agency of the Federal Government if the plaintiff seeks employment
with such agency; but the record may be disseminated to law enforce-
ment agencies for law enforcement purposes."' 4 In reaching its decision
the District Court emphasized that "[u]nder our system of criminal
justice, only a conviction carries legal significance as to a person's crimi-
nal behavior,"'" and elaborated on this point by quoting from an opinion
of the U.S. Supreme Court:
The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any,
probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An
arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the
person apprehended of an offense. When formal charges are not filed
against the arrested person and he is released without trial, whatever
probative force the arrest may have had is normally dissipated. 6
Plaintiff argued that maintenance and use of an arrest record without
an ensuing conviction violated the constitutional guarantees of presump-
tion of innocence, of due process, of the right to privacy and freedom
from unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Of these argu-
ments the District Court singled out the right to privacy as inherent in
the American constitutional form of government, warning, "[i]f infor-
mation available to Government is misused to publicize past incidents
in the lives of its citizens the pressures for conformity will be irresistible.
Initiative and individuality can be suffocated and a resulting dullness of
mind and conduct will become the norm."' 17
The court discussed the 1930 statute, 8 expressing the belief that it
must be narrowly interpreted, especially in view of the defects in the
reporting system. As its principle faults the court enumerates: 1) The
complete lack of uniformity, as state and local agencies receive criminal
record data for employment purposes whenever authorized by local
enactment. A partial list of such enactments shows as one extreme
example a local enactment of Provincetown, Massachusetts, under
which a fingerprint is to be taken of all non-residents seeking employ-
ment. 2) Lack of control by the Federal Bureau of Investigation over
improper dissemination by any of the hundreds of local agencies to
which information is supplied against which no criminal or civil sanc-
"328 F. Supp. at 725-28.
'
5Id. at 724.
"Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957).
'1328 F. Supp. at 726.
I"28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1970). See text accompanying note 6, supra.
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tions are provided. 3) The frequent lack of completeness and accuracy
of the arrest record material which is not counterbalanced by any proce-
dure through which individuals could obtain, correct or supplant record
information used against them and of any assurance that an individual
even knows that his employment application is affected by a fingerprint
record of the FBI. 4) The incapacity of the Division for employment
data to cope with the ever increasing demand of additional applicants
who fall within its own vague standards of eligibility of obtaining infor-
mation. 9
Assessing these findings the court concluded that the system was out
of effective control and that legislative guidance creating adequate sanc-
tions and administrative safeguards was necessary. In the meantime, the
court found that "[the] Bureau is without authority to disseminate arrest
records outside the Federal Government for employment, licensing or
related purposes whether or not the record reflects a later conviction,"2'
contrasting the use for these purposes with that for law enforcement
purposes only.
There is a compelling necessity to furnish arrest data to other law
enforcement agencies for strictly law enforcing purposes. Arrest re-
cords are available in uncovering criminal conduct, they play a signifi-
cant role in the prosecutor's exercise of discretion, they greatly aid in
setting bond, determining sentences and facilitating the work of penal
or other institutions of correction. When arrest records are used for
such purposes, they are subject to due process limitations within the
criminal process, and misuse may be checked by judicial action. 21
From this it concluded that plaintiff's arrest record "will not be ex-
punged where its dissemination outside the Federal Government is lim-
ited to law enforcement purposes. '"22
In reality (though in form of dictum) touching the very essence of the
problem of records of arrests not followed by conviction, the Court of
Appeals said:
Realistically, the FBI cannot be expected to investigate the facts un-
derlying every arrest or retention reported to it; the most it can do is
examine the report on its face and, perhaps, investigate further if a
complaint is received from the individual concerned. For most of those
"328 F. Supp. 718, at 726-27.
10328 F. Supp. at 726-27.
2
"Id. at 727. It may be doubtful whether due process is a sufficient protection against the use of
records of arrest not followed by conviction, as the discretion of the prosecutor or that of the judge




arrested-too poor, too ignorant, and often too disheartened to com-
plain-the only adequate remedy may lie either in severely curtailing
any use of records of arrest or in eliminating altogether their mainte-
nance in a file associated with the individual's name (emphasis sup-
plied).2:
The Menard decisions have been quoted extensively here because
their wording sheds so much light upon the working of the arrest records
system. They have been used as a starting point in Eddy.v. Moore.4
Harriet Eddy was arrested, fingerprinted, photographed and charged
with assault by the Seattle Police Department. At trial the charges were
dismissed, but the Chief of Police, Moore, denied her request to return
her fingerprints and photographs, and her petition for a writ of mandate
ordering him to show cause why they should not be returned was refused
by the trial court on the ground that she had no legal right to their
return. The Court of Appeals reversed, tracing the development of the
right to privacy. While it did not go so far as to conclude that that right
following an acquittal creates an absolute bar to the retention of such
records, it continued:
The value of fingerprints and photographs of an arrested person de-
pends upon two factors: An assumption the individual arrested did in
fact commit the crime for which he is accused and that his commission
of this crime indicates a likelihood that other crimes will be commit-
ted. An acquittal seems to negate both premises. Where the only rea-
son for the presence of an individual's fingerprints and photographs in
the police file is based upon an arrest which has subsequently been
voided by an acquittal and no further justification is made for the
retention of these fingerprints and photographs, no rational basis for
their retention remains.2"
From this the court concluded that it would require a compelling show-
ing on the part of the state to justify the retention of the fingerprints
and photographs; that to require this did not put an undue burden upon
law enforcement agencies; and that the Washington statutes governing
what is done with fingerprints and photographs upon acquittal were too
limited in scope and therefore constitutionally defective by omission. As
the Seattle Police Department had made no compelling showing, the
court directed it to return the fingerprints and photographs to Mrs.
Eddy. The decision seems to go beyond the Menard case.
The problem of how to handle records of arrests which were not
2-430 F.2d at 495 n.51.
115 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
115 Wash. App. at 344, 487 P.2d at 217.
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followed by conviction has in recent times been handled in some further
cases and with varying results. Special treatment was given to juveniles.
In T.N.G. v. Superior Court of San Francisco26 the court denied a
petition for mandamus seeking an order to seal records of the short
detention of several juveniles. The court thought that a juvenile tempo-
rarily detained by juvenile court authorities and subsequently released
without further proceedings does not become subject to a record which
should be described as an "arrest" or "detention" record and therefore
in completing application forms for educational or occupational oppor-
tunities, such juvenile need not state that he had been "arrested" or
"detained." This, together with the fact that the juvenile court need not
disclose that any juvenile had been detained if he has never been brought
before the court2 7 made formal sealing of the record superfluous. Also
regarding the request for immediate sealing, the court denied any un-
constitutionality under either the equal protection or the due process
clause, of two other California laws, attacked on grounds that they
discriminated between youths of different ages; one provides that a
juvenile record including information as to arrest, detention and ward-
ship may be sealed when the juvenile reaches majority or on expiration
of five years from the date on which jurisdiction of the juvenile court
terminates;28 the second allows any minor not a juvenile who has been
arrested for a misdemeanor and treated as an adult but not convicted
of the offense to petition the court at any time for an order to have the
record sealed.2 9
Two recent New York cases concerning juveniles move toward pro-
tecting the juveniles from the disadvantages of a genuine arrest record.
In the case of John Harry v. Loney, 0 a juvenile, age 15, was arrested
and charged with attempted burglary; he had knocked at the rear door
of the house of a friend with whom he expected to go boating and peered
through the windows; seeing no one, he raced back to the boat on which
he had come, to join another companion. The court ruled that he was
not entitled to a declaration that the arrest was null and void since at
the time of the arrest there may have been probable cause, but that he
was entitled to have his and his parents' surname obliterated from all
records and other documents in the possession of the police that re-
flected on the arrest, and to have all records of the court proceeding
14 Cal. 3d 767, 484 P.2d 981, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1971).
"'CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827 (West 1971).
2 ld. § 781.
2'CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.7 (West 1971).
.165 Misc. 2d 759, 317 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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* sealed, subject to inspection only at the arrestee's request or upon an
order of the court. Recognizing a duty of the arrestee to answer affirma-
tively the question, "Have you ever been arrested?" the court declined
to grant total expunction, yet did grant the lesser relief described even
in the absence of special legislation, lack of which the court deprecated
strongly, because it perceived no benefit in maintaining the arrest record
open. It distinguished this case from those of failure of convictions for
reasons other than innocence, such as suppression of evidence, with-
drawal of charges, or refusal of the victim of a crime to testify. In all
such cases the court would see a public interest in the retention of the
arrest records as a means of identification in the apprehension of crimi-
nals and fugitives.
A very similar result was reached in another juvenile case, In re
Smith." Here the police had taken into custody two boys, 14 and 15
years old, during a demonstration in front of a public school, alleging
acts that could amount to unlawful assembly and riot; the court allowed
counsel for the police department to withdraw its petition on the
grounds of failure to establish a prima facie case. The court emphasized
that prohibiting inspection of the record by future employers would be
ineffective for the reason that they often require the job-seeking juvenile
to obtain from the clerk of the juvenile court a certificate about his
record. Also, the Armed Forces require the juvenile to waive confiden-
tiality of his record, and police regulations themselves allow information
to be given to various agencies; the court noted in addition that private
investigators can secure police records. Owing to the tendency of the
economic world to presume guilt from an arrest record, and to the
complete lack of evidence against the juveniles as distinguished from
mere procedural snags, while not granting total expungement, the court
ordered obliteration of the surnames of the juveniles and their parents
from all records of the clerk of the court and of the Police Department,
and the sealing of the petitions, to be kept separate from the regular
petition files. Complete protection, the court said, would be possible
only by a statute forbidding employers' inquiries" or by a statutory
procedure nullifying abortive arrests. Absent such statutes, the preserva-
tion of the petition is advisable so that a prospective employer willing
to make a further inquiry can obtain the complete history of this pro-
ceeding.
1'63 Misc. 2d 198, 310 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Family Ct. 1970).
2Such a statute was passed in 1965 and in 1966 by the New York Assembly but was defeated
both times in the New York Senate. Hess and Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not
Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 494, 499 (1967).
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With regard to adults, various degrees of relief have been granted
against the use of records of arrests which did not lead to convictions.
In some cases the application of civil rights statutes led to complete
expunction of the records. In Wheeler v. Goodman33 the court de-
clared unconstitutional for vagueness a North Carolina vagrancy statute
under which persons had been arrested as hippies and had been driven
away from their rented house in what the court described as a bizarre
story of police harassment. The court, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983," 4
granted the requested relief of expunction of the arrest record. It was
considered a question of semantics whether an unlawful arrest had ever
occurred, so that a person thus arrested could deny that he had ever been
arrested. Arrest records exist, the court said, to facilitate criminal
investigation, but cannot perform any such function in this case where
the arrestees have committed no crime, and retention of the arrest
record cannot be justified as criminal identification. Though expunction
may not be appropriate every time an arrestee is acquitted or is released
without prosecution, here the youth of the arrestees, their innocence of
any crime, the extreme misbehavior of the police in making arrests
without probable cause and the absence of any benefit to society in the
maintenance of the records justified the expunction.
Another case where the expunction resulted from the application of
civil rights legislation is United States v. McLeod.35 The court found
that arrests and prosecution of various persons for violation of local
laws were to intimidate Negro citizens of the county, interfering with
their right to vote by discouraging an attempt to register. On the basis
of the Civil Rights Act of 196436 the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision below, holding that the District Court should enter an order
requiring the appropriate county officials to return all fines and to
expunge from the record all arrests and convictions resulting from the
prosecution which formed the basis of these suits. The District Court
was also to order reimbursement by the county of all costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the defense of the state criminal
prosecutions and it was to take whatever additional action might be
necessary to return the individuals to their status quo ante.
11306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
:"This section is concerned with rights of redress in citizens who have been deprived under color
of state law of rights guaranteed under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
35385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
3642 U.S.C. § 1971(b) provides that no person shall interfere or attempt to interfere with the
right of another person to vote in an election for federal office; (c) provides authority for the




The protection of civil rights was again the basis for an expungement
order in Hughs v. Rizzo.37 Here, on various occasions hippies and
persons associating with them had been arrested for the obvious purpose
of harassing them away from Rittenhouse Square in Philadelphia; there
was no probable cause for the arrests and all were released soon after-
ward. On the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the court ordered:
The defendants shall forthwith cause to be physically expunged from
all police department records, and from the records of any law enforce-
ment agencies to which the same may have been forwarded or referred,
all references to the plaintiffs and other persons arrested in Ritten-
house Square in connection with the plaintiffs on the evenings of June
17 and July 5, 1967; and shall return to those arrested, or destroy, all
photographs (including the negatives and all copies, prints and reprod-
uctions of said photographs) taken by or at the direction of the police,
of said persons arrested. Certification of compliance with this order
shall be filed in this Court within thirty (30) days.38
A much broader basis for an expungement order was used by the
court in United States v. Kalish.39 The somewhat involved facts show
that Kalish was ordered by his local draft board to report for induction
in the United States Army on May 1, 1967. Prior to the reporting date
he had received notice of his acceptance into the Law School of the
University of Puerto Rico. He alleged that he notified the draft board
of that fact and that under the then-existing regulations he was entitled
to have his status reopened and reclassified or, in case of denial, to a
hearing before the Local Board. He also alleged that the Board refused
to reopen or reclassify his status and did not afford him a hearing.
Kalish reported for induction on May 1; on the same day his counsel
filed a petition for habeas corpus; the court issued an order directing
the Acting State Director of the U.S. Selective Service System for
Puerto Rico to show cause on May 3 why Kalish should not be released
from custody and his classification opened. The order was served on
May 1; when Kalish, on advice of counsel, refused to step forward and
be sworn in he was released from custody. On May 3, the return day of
the show-cause order, the Assistant U.S. Attorney informed the court
that there had been an agreement with Kalish's counsel to allow the
latter to reopen the selective service proceedings. This agreement not-
withstanding, an information was lodged against Kalish for failure to
submit to induction. Kalish and his attorney first heard of the arrest
7282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
uld. at 885.
11271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967).
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order when they were present in court on the return of the show-cause
order. Kalish took the stand and under oath testified that he had no
intention of violating the laws of the United States, that his refusal to
step forward and be sworn into the U.S. Army was based upon the
advice of counsel, that his purpose in filing the habeas corpus petition
was to secure due process of law, and that he voluntarily surrendered
himself to the jurisdiction of the court and was willing to be inducted
into the U.S. Army then and there. In spite of this the U.S. Attorney
insisted that Kalish be processed, arrested, fingerprinted and photo-
graphed.
The Government, in answering Kalish's motion for an order to ex-
punge and destroy photographs and fingerprints, claimed that there is
no Congressional statute authorizing the return or destruction of the
criminal identification of persons eventually found innocent or those
discharged without conviction. The court believed that when arrested,
an accused does not have a constitutional right of privacy that outweighs
the necessity of protecting society by the accumulation of this data, no
matter how mistaken the arrest may have been. But, when an accused
is acquitted or when he is discharged without conviction, the court held
that no public good is accomplished by the retention of criminal identifi-
cation records, that great imposition is placed upon a citizen and that
his privacy and personal dignity is invaded as long as the Justice Depart-
ment retains "criminal" identification records, "criminal" arrest re-
cords, fingerprints, etc. On this broad basis the court ordered that the
Attorney General of the United States should forthwith destroy the
arrest records and identification records involved including the finger-
prints and photographs and all copies thereof, then in the custody of or
maintained by the Identification Division of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, that said records or identification data should not be trans-
mitted to any other governmental agency or any person and that the
Attorney General should promptly notify the court of the time, place
and manner in which said records have been destroyed."
Other cases have denied interference with records of arrest not lead-
ing to conviction, or have granted only limited relief. In Hershel v.
Dyra,4 Hershel was arrested for violating a Chicago anti-litter ordi-
nance; at the hearing the case was non-suited on the city's motion.
'"In Kowall v. United States the court took the sweeping position that a federal district court in
vacating a sentence according to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may totally expunge arrest records where it is
found "that the public interest in retaining records of a specific arrest is clearly outweighed by the
dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences to the individual." 53 F.R.D. 211, 214 (W.D. Mich.
1971).
"365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 973 (1966).
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Hershel brought suit in the Federal District Court asking for damages
for false arrest on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 198342 and petitioning for
an order directing the Superintendent of Police to expunge and annul
all records under his care, custody and control in the Chicago Police
Department pertaining to his arrest. The District Court granted defen-
dants' motion to strike the complaint and dismiss the cause of action.
The appellate court reversed and remanded as to the damage claim, but
affirmed as to the motion for expunction of the records. The court
referred to decisions by Illinois courts saying that absent express legisla-
tive authority to the contrary the Superintendent of Police may retain
all arrest records regardless of whether the accused has been acquitted,
discharged, or otherwise released from the charges brought against him,
relying on cases cited by defendants holding that the retention of finger-
prints and other arrest records by the police, even after discharge, does
not violate any constitutional right of the accused. It concluded that
under the obligation of the Chicago Police Department to maintain
public safety and welfare in Chicago the Superintendent of Police is
justified and duty bound to compile and retain arrest records of all
persons arrested, and that the execution of this policy does not violate
the arrested person's right of privacy.
In Weisberg v. Police Department" Weisberg, a diabetic, was ar-
rested after he entered a grocery store and tried to take something sweet
to eat to stave off insulin shock. When these facts were made known in
court the charge was withdrawn, and he then petitioned for removal and
destruction of his arrest record from the arrest records of the Police
Department of the Village of Lynbrook and the Nassau County Police
Department. The court admitted that petitioner's fear that the arrest
record might hurt him both professionally and in his efforts to obtain
government employment might not be groundless, based on the intro-
duction of a bill in the New York Senate making it a misdemeanor for
any employer "to inquire or ask any person whether or not he has ever
been arrested, as a condition of employment or continuing employ-
ment."44 But the court rejected the petition for lack of power in the
courts to interfere with the police records. This lack of power the court
deduced from the existence of state statutes that regulate the matter by
giving such powers to interfere to other agencies, but not to the courts,
and from the absence of any inherent power of the courts over police
department records as contrasted with their own records; the court felt
"
2 See note 34 supra.
"146 Misc.2d 846, 260 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
"46 Misc. 2d at 846, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 555; see note 30 supra.
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this viewpoint was supported by a special provision of the state code of
criminal procedure that upon acquittal or dismissal fingerprints taken
as a condition to admission to bail are, on demand, to be returned to
defendant or destroyed in his presence.45 The court suggested legislation
steps toward limiting access to an arrest record when no information
or indictment is returned.
An elaborate ruling about the question of expungement of a record
of arrest not followed by conviction can be found in Morrow v. District
of Columbia." Morrow was arrested and charged with disorderly con-
duct for swearing at a police officer. When the Corporation Counsel of
the District of Columbia brought him to trial in the District of Colum-
bia Court of General Sessions the court ordered the case dismissed
because prosecution for that offense could be brought only by the
United States Attorney. Morrow immediately moved for expungement
of the record of this arrest from Police Department files. The judge of
General Sessions Court, Judge Alexander, issued an order instructing
the Corporation Counsel not to disseminate the information pertaining
to Morrow's arrest. The District did not appeal this order but later the
Corporation Counsel requested Judge Alexander to reduce his order to
writing. This the judge did, issuing the following detailed order:
The District of Columbia and all of its agencies and officials, including
the Commissioners of the District of Columbia and their agents includ-
ing the Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department and all
his agents, and including every member of the Metropolitan Police
Department of the District of Columbia and their agents are prohib-
ited, effective September 25, 1967, the date on which this order was
first directed to such persons in the presence of their attorney, the
Assistant Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, from dis-
tributing, communicating, transmitting, or otherwise making available
or providing information regarding the record or information of the
arrest on August 30, 1967 of Mr. Don Morrow, defendant in these
proceedings, to any other governmental or private agency or person,
including other law enforcement agencies or officials until further
order of this Court. 47
Shortly afterwards the so-called Duncan Report" about the use of
arrest records was published, and on October 31, 1967 the Commission-
'"N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 552-a (McKinney 1971).
11417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
7Id. at 730 n.3.
"ARREST RECORDS COMMITTEE, D.C. BOARD OF COMM'RS., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE EFFECT OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1967).
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ers adopted virtually all its recommendations which became law 90 days
later.49 Upon the adoption of this report the Corporation Counsel
moved for Judge Alexander to limit his original order in scope in ac-
cordance with the Duncan Report, the main change being that the Mor-
row arrest record in this case could be disseminated to other law en-
forcement agencies. Morrow opposed this motion, asked for an order
of physical expunction of the arrest record and for a subpoena duces
tecum to produce certain records to determine whether the Police De-
partment was complying with Judge Alexander's order. Judge Alexan-
der denied the motion to amend the order, issued the subpoena and
started hearings on compliance. At this point the Corporation Counsel
obtained from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a decision
holding that it had the power to issue extraordinary writs and that
mandamus and prohibition were appropriate because the Court of Gen-
eral Sessions did not have any ancillary jurisdiction in a criminal case
to issue orders prohibiting dissemination of arrest records.5 0
Judge Alexander and Morrow then were allowed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia to appeal from the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court of Appeals5" held that
the District Court of Appeals did have the power to issue extraordinary
writs in supervision of the Court of General Sessions, and that it was
also appropriate for the District Court of Appeals to act upon the
petition for mandamus and writ of prohibition. However, contrary to
the District Court of Appeals' holding, the Court of General Sessions
did have ancillary jurisdiction in a criminal case to issue protective
orders regarding dissemination of arrest records. The court saw as rele-
"The recommendations result from minutes of the October 31, 1967 meeting of the Board of
Commissioners which form an appendix to the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 417 F.2d
745, 746. Their main provisions as to adult arrest records are that such records are to be released
upon request, without cost and without the authorization by the person to whom they relate, to
law enforcement agents (i.e., persons having cognizance of criminal investigation directly involving
the individuals to whom the requested records relate, including judges, prosecutors, defense attor-
neys with respect to the records of their client defendants, police officers, etc., but excluding private
detectives and investigators, etc.) if such agents represent that such records are to be used for law
enforcement purposes. Subject to this, adult arrest records shall be released in a form which reveals
only entries relating to offenses which have resulted in convictions or forfeitures of collateral.
Subject to this, copies or extracts of adult arrest records or statements as to nonexistence of such
records shall be released upon formal application and payment of a fee to persons not qualifying
as law enforcement agents, provided that applicants who are not the person to whom such records
relate must present releases by the persons to whom the records may relate. Punishment by a fine
up to $50.00 is established for any person to require as a condition of employment the production
of any arrest record or copy, extract or statement thereof at the expense of any employee or
applicant for employment to whom such record may relate.
'in re Alexander, 243 A.2d 901 (D.C. Ct. App., 1968).
51417 F.2d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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vant points of the Duncan Report recommendations as adopted by the
Commissioners, that arrest records cannot be furnished to employers
unless the record is recopied to include only those arrests resulting in
convictions or forfeitures of collateral, although complete and unexpur-
gated arrest records can be disseminated to other law enforcement agen-
cies. 2 Reversing the District Court of Appeals insofar as it denied the
ancillary jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions, the Circuit Court
of Appeals remanded the case for the decision of the substantive issue
as to the proper scope of the order to control dissemination. The main
evil of dissemination lying in its adverse effect on job opportunities, the
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Duncan Report rules would
be a good rule of thumb as to the appropriate scope of a court order
prohibiting dissemination; however, other evils such as unjustified inva-
sion of privacy, particularly where innocent persons are arrested, could
result from such dissemination in particular cases. On remand, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeals53 concluded that the Duncan Report rules then
in force furnished reasonable and adequate protection against the mis-
use of arrest records and that no further order was required for that
purpose, except in rare cases presenting such unusual facts as to justify
the expungement of a particular arrest record; it felt that the Morrow
case presented no such unusual facts, and that therefore the order of the
trial court was to be vacated. The practical result of this decision is that,
contrary to the original order, the Morrow arrest record could be dis-
seminated to other law enforcement agencies for law enforcement pur-
poses.
In Irani v. District of Columbia4 Irani, a graduate student with a
security clearance for federal employment, was arrested for parading
without a permit. The District of Columbia determined not to prosecute
because of lack of evidence, and Irani then requested that the trial court
order the record of the arrest expunged. Factually, Irani established
without contradiction that he was arrested in connection with a civil
disturbance at which he was innocently and unavoidably present, having
just left a cancelled class at a local university where the disturbance was
in progress. The trial court denied expunction following the rulings of
the decision in In re Alexander (in the Morrow complex); "5 it found that
the facts did not qualify as "unusual facts" under the Alexander ruling,
there being no ruling by the District Court of Appeals that a dismissal
'
21d. at 742 and note 49 supra.
"IJn re Alexander, 259 A.2d 592 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
54272 A.2d 849 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
s 259 A.2d 592 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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for lack of evidence is of itself a proper ground to order expungement
of an arrest record. On appeal the District Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded for an exercise of judgment by the trial court as to the
form of relief which it might deem appropriate. It interpreted the facts
to be that Irani had affirmatively established that he was innocently
present for legitimate reasons and that his arrest was a mistake. It
concluded that such circumstances reveal a "rare case presenting such
unusual facts as to justify" some relief in the meaning of the Alexander
case and held that where one arrested for an offense successfully makes
an affirmative demonstration negating actual guilt, it is error to deny
relief outright.
In a concurring opinion56 Associate Judge Nebeker suggested guide-
lines for what the trial court could do upon remand. He detailed the
contents of Irani's request for expunction, i.e., the physical destruction
of all records along with photographs and fingerprints; he had also
requested that he be supplied with the names of other officials who
might know of the event, presumably in order that he might seek similar
relief against them. Judge Nebeker doubted that complete relief could
be obtained even through expunction as long as the arrestee, or for that
matter the arresting officer, would violate legal provisions regarding
case statements, perjury, etc., if he denied the arrest. He also questioned
whether fingerprints taken at such an arrest must never be used, even
for identification in the event of an untimely death or for other non-
criminal purposes. The judge thought there were many legitimate and
practical reasons consistent with the public interest why the trial court
might not wish to erase the historical fact of the arrest, or even give the
appearance of doing so. He felt that the trial court might consider
whether an order directing complete or limited expunction was appro-
priate; as an alternative, the court could consider an order requiring the
Metropolitan Police Department to amend its records to reflect the
determination that Irani had established his complete lack of culpability
and had affirmatively shown factual innocence regarding the incident.
Such information would then be forwarded to any other agency possess-
ing a record of the arrest, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
In another decision based on the civil rights legislation some relief has
been worked out, aiming not at the dissemination of criminal records
but rather at the use by a third party of a record of arrests not followed
by convictions. In Gregory v. Litton Systems Inc.,57 the plaintiff, a
Negro, sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641s for mone-
51272 A.2d at 851-853.
11316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
142 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.: the Equal Opportunity Employment Provisions.
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tary and injunctive relief, alleging that defendant had in 1968 refused
to employ him for the sole reason that he had previously been arrested
on fourteen different occasions, thirteen of them before 1959, though he
had never been convicted of any criminal offense. He also alleged that
defendant had a "standard policy" of not hiring applicants who had
been arrested on a "number of occasions" for reasons other than minor
traffic offenses, and that in effectuating this policy defendant required
all applicants to fill out a form asking for a listing of all arrests other
than those involving minor traffic offenses. The court held that this
policy had the foreseeable effect of denying black applicants an equal
opportunity for employment and was unlawful under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 even if it appeared on its face to be racially neutral and had
not been applied discriminatorily as between applicants of different
races. It reached this conclusion on the finding first, that there was no
evidence that persons never convicted but arrested a number of times
would perform less efficiently or less honestly than others, the evidence
being overwhelmingly to the contrary; therefore information about ar-
rests not followed by conviction was irrelevant to the suitability for
employment. Secondly, it was noted that Negroes are arrested far more
frequently than whites in proportion to their numbers; though compris-
ing some 11% of the population, blacks account for 27% of reported
arrests and for 45% of arrests reported as "suspicion arrests." In conse-
quence, the court granted the plaintiff stipulated compensatory damages
as well as attorney's fees, and for the protection of plaintiff as well as
other applicants similarly situated because of their race, enjoined defen-
dant in the following way:
A. From continued discrimination against plaintiff and other per-
sons similarly situated because of their race, arising out of prior arrests
involving no conviction.
B. From seeking from applicants for employment, by question-
naires, forms, or verbally, information concerning their prior arrests
which did not result in conviction.
C. From utilizing as a factor in determining any condition of em-
ployment, including hiring, promotion and termination, any record of
arrest which did not result in conviction.
D. In view of the fact that arrest information, which is not a matter
of public record, can apparently be obtained cheaply and easily from
sources other than the applicant, defendant will be restrained from
seeking, obtaining, or considering, in connection with employment of
applicants, information concerning arrests of such applicants which
did not result in conviction, provided, however, that this shall not
prohibit defendant from seeking and obtaining information on the
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public record, but provided further that public record information
concerning arrests alone may not be utilized, as provided in C above
as a factor in determining any condition of employment. 9
In connection with its statement about the irrelevance of a series of
arrests not followed by conviction to efficient and honest performance
on the job the court mentioned that "[i]n recognition of this irrelevance
the County of Los Angeles, a large scale employer, has ceased to ask
for arrest information for employment."6 Even more significant is the
fact that in 1966 the standard U.S. Government employment applica-
tion form (Form 57) was changed to require information concerning
only those arrests followed by conviction, rather than all arrests.6 How-
ever, as long as the Civil Service Commission works under Executive
Order No. 1045062 and includes in its investigation a check of the finger-
print files of the FBI no real change can be expected from the moderni-
zation of Form 57.
The Gregory decision, progressive though it is, still raises questions.
Based solely upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it gives relief only to
members of minority groups, while relief against using records of arrest
as such appears desirable for everyone. Also, as long as access to infor-
mation from public records is allowed under paragraph D, it may not
be utilized if it concerns records of arrests alone. Yet there is still the
danger that, subconsciously at least, such information will influence the
decision whether or not to employ the person concerned. 3
Considering the cases discussed one realizes that they run the gamut
from denying any relief concerning the availability of records of arrests
which did not lead to conviction, through the granting of limited relief,
to complete expunction, another example of lack of uniformity as exist-
ing with regard to so many legal issues. It has also been seen that
federal, state and local statutes or regulations differ widely and, on
occasions, were declared to be insufficient or even incompatible with the
United States Constitution. 4 It also appeared that at times courts have
11316 F. Supp. at 404.
'"ld. at 403.
6 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967).
"
2 Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 72 (Supp. 1953), 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1970); the relevant section
is quoted in the text accompanying note 8 supra.
"The court distinguishes "records of arrests which do not result in formal prosecution or trial,"
declaring them not to be matters of public record, from "information which is on the public records
concerning the prosecution and trial of any prospective employee, even if the proceeding eventually
resulted in an acquittal." Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403.
"See, text accompanying notes 5,6,7,8,23,24,27,28,29,43,49 supra. Examples of statutes not
mentioned before include CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-90 and 90(a) (Supp. 1972-73). This statute
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deprecated the absence of any statutory rules and called for their enact-
ment, possibly in a uniform fashion. 5
A small step in the direction of uniform legislation regarding criminal
justice data was taken in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970.66 It
inserted into § 519 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 19687 a new paragraph reading: "Not later than May 1, 1971, the
Administration"8 shall submit to the President and the Congress recom-
mendations for legislation to assist in the purpose of this title with
respect to promoting the integrity and accuracy of criminal justice data
collection, processing, and dissemination systems founded in whole or
in part by the Federal Government, and protecting the constitutional
rights of all persons covered or afflicted by such systems." The Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, on the basis of recommenda-
tions by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice,69 started a program called SEARCH-System for
Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories-"a prototype,
computerized system for the exchange of criminal history information
among the States."70 In December 1970, this program was turned over
to the FBI for further development,7 and at the same time Congress
orders the automatic eradication of all police and court records and of those of the prosecuting
attorney, in case of a final judgment of acquittal or in case of dismissal of the charge. In certain
other cases, for example in case of an absolute pardon, the person involved or his heir may petition
for erasure. In any case of eradication the person arrested shall be deemed not to have been arrested
ab initio. The statute appears insufficient as far as the status of information submitted to the FBI
is concerned: it is also unclear whether it gives the arrestee the legal right after erasure to deny
any such arrest later on. In Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1631 (1964) simply declares
confidential all criminal and administrative records of the State Police and the Bureau of Identifi-
cation with certain exceptions, among them information made available in open court and informa-
tion on pending cases which would not jeopardize their investigation or prosecution. Oregon has a
provision about confidentiality of fingerprints, photograph records and reports in criminal matters,
and requires both law enforcement agencies and courts to report case dispositions to the central
bureau of criminal identification. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 181.510, .520, .540 (1970). Neither statute
covers the handling of the information given to the FBI. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79-e (McKin-
ney 1971) provides for the return of photographs, fingerprints, etc. taken in a criminal action
determined in favor of the accused, but only on condition that no other criminal action is pending
against him and that he has not previously been convicted of a crime or of loitering either within
or without the state of New York.
"See text accompanying notes 30, 32, 41, 43 supra.
"42 U.S.C. § 3767b (1972).
-142 U.S.C. § 3767 (1970).
"The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, created by the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 519, 42 U.S.C. 3711 (1970).
"PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 261-66 (1967).
101 17 CONG. REC. 14,563 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 197 1); introduction to S. 2546, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1971) by Sen. Hruska.
71Id.
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passed the above quoted amendment to the 1968 Act. Senator Hruska
admitted that the hearings, early in 1971, by the Senate Subcommittee
on Civil Rights had amply demonstrated how much more critical the
issue of the individual's right to privacy has become in the computer
age.72
On September 20, 1971, more than four months after the expiration
of the above mentioned deadline, the United States Attorney General
submitted to the Vice President, as President of the Senate, the re-
quested legislative recommendations which then were introduced by
Senator Hruska under the title of The Criminal Justice Information
System Security and Privacy Act of 1971 .7 The bill contained few if
any substantive innovations of any protective character. Though it in-
cludes case disposition within the meaning of "criminal offender record
information" as well as summaries of arrests and identification data,
(§ 2(2)), it takes no specific steps at all toward securing the complete-
ness of the record in this regard; it merely presents a vague and rather
complicated procedure through which an individual can obtain informa-
tion about or a copy of his record for the purpose of challenge or
corrections (§ 3(c)). It provides for both criminal and civil liability of
those who willfully violate the Act, but good faith reliance upon the
provisions of the Act or any other applicable law, rules, regulations or
procedures prescribed thereunder would constitute a complete defense
to civil or criminal action brought under this Act (§ 6). The bill is
applicable only to information systems funded, at least in part, by the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which automatically ex-
cludes those maintained by the FBI or other federal law enforcement
agencies such as the Secret Service or the Customs Bureau (§ 2(1)).
Though the included information systems (i.e., those of states, or of
local agencies if financially aided by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration) shall on principle be available only to law enforcement
agencies and be used only for law enforcement purposes, "qualified
individuals" may have access to them for research purposes under regu-
lations to be established by the Attorney General (§ 3(a), (b). An omni-
bus provision equates to "law enforcement purposes" such additional
purposes necessary to the proper enforcement or administration of other
provisionsof the law as the Attorney General may prescribe by regula-
tions issued under § 6 (§ 3(a)). The broad authorization given the At-
torney General in § 6 reads: "The Attorney General is authorized, after
721d.
11S.2546, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary.
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appropriate consultation with representatives of State and local law
enforcement agencies participating in information systems covered by
this Act, to establish such rules, regulations and procedures as he may
deem necessary to effectuate the provisions of this Act."
In the section-by-section analysis which the Attorney General at-
tached to his letter of transmission of the draft bill to the Vice President,
he significantly interpreted § 6 with reference to the "additional" dis-
semination purposes mentioned in § 3(a) in the following manner: "It
is intended that agencies that use criminal justice information for valid
non-law enforcement purposes as, for example, counterintelligence,
personal suitability, or security, may continue to do so, but must obtain
the information through a law enforcement agency." (Emphasis sup-
plied). This changes little, if anything, from the present situation. No
differentiation at all is made anywhere in the bill about "criminal of-
fender record information" between arrests that have led to conviction
and those that have not.
Another legislative initiative was taken by Congressman Don Ed-
wards of CaliforniaI4 His bill provides for inspection by the arrestee of
his criminal arrest record and for disclosure to him, upon his request,
of all persons to whom, in the six months previous to such request, his
arrest record had been disclosed. It would allow for a suit in the United
States District Court to enjoin maintenance or dissemination of a record
that is in violation of the Act and would permit orders for correction of
an incorrect record; it also would provide civil and criminal sanctions
for maintaining, disseminating or using a criminal record in violation
of the act, such sanctions extending to the FBI and other federal officers
and employees, and for the first time would take a modest step in the
direction of distinguishing records of arrests that did not lead to convic-
tion. Section 3102, subsection (a) of the Bill reads:
No officer or employee of the United States or of a federally assisted
law enforcement agency, and with respect to a criminal arrest record
received from an officer or employee of the United States or of a
federally assisted law enforcement agency, no officer or employee of
any law enforcement agency, may disseminate to any person a criminal
arrest record-
(1) relating to an arrest which occurred more than two years before
the date of such dissemination and concerning which there is no prose-
cution pending in a court;
(2) relating to an arrest concerning which the prosecuting attorney
responsible for conducting any prosecution arising out of such arrest
71117 CONG. REC. 14,564-65 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1971).
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agrees no prosecution is warranted and that no criminal record should
be kept; or
(3) which is expunged, or prohibited from being maintained under a
provision of the law of the State in which the arrest which is the subject
of such record occurred, or by order of a court having jurisdiction with
respect to such arrest.
According to subsection (c), clause (1) of subsection (a) is not applica-
ble to an arrest record concerning a person who has ever been convicted
of a felony under any federal or state law.
Exceptions from these prohibitions may be obtained only through an
order of a federal. court having jurisdiction upon application by the
Attorney General or any officer of a law enforcement agency, indicating
in writing and under oath or affirmation all facts relied upon by the
applicant to justify his petition (§§ 3102(e), 3105). Finally, the bill would
give the arrestee some help against interrogations about his arrests by
providing: "In responding to any question concerning any arrest the
respondent may consider such question to apply only to an arrest the
record of which may be lawfully disseminated, maintained or used by
the Attorney General. No person shall be required to waive the right
granted to him by this section nor shall any person be penalized in any
manner for exercizing such right." (§ 3106)
Neither of the two bills discussed has become law.
The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding examination is that
at present the American handling of records of arrests not followed by
conviction is unsatisfactory. The defects hinge on two points: first, that
on principle, every criminal proceeding starts with arrest, a fact that has
brought about in the minds of many a distortion of the maxim that a
man is presumed innocent until convicted, and second, that because of
the presence of an arrest as an element of most criminal proceedings,
criminal records in this country center around arrest rather than around
convictions. It should be of interest to learn how some of the civil law
countries handle these two problems.
II. CIVIL LAW PRACTICE
A. Switzerland
In Switzerland the Federal Act on Federal Criminal Procedure
provides:
The person accused can be the object of an order of arrest only if there
exists against him a grave suspicion of being guilty and if, besides, one
of the following conditions is fulfilled:
711 18 CONG. REC. 1467 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972); introduction to H.R. 13,315, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess. (1972) by Cong. Edwards. The bill was to introduce a new ch. 177, tit. 28
U.S.C.-Dissemination of Arrest Records-with sections numbered 3101 through 3110. It was
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
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(1) that there is a strong suspicion of flight; such suspicion may be
assumed to exist especially if the accused person is under suspicion of
a violation punishable with hard labor or if he is not able to establish
his identity or has no domicil in Switzerland;
(2) if definite circumstances lead to the suspicion that he wants to
destroy traces of the violation or to induce witnesses or persons co-
accused to make false statements or in some other way to interfere
with the result of the inquiry.7 6
It is important that the presumption of suspicion of flight under § (1)
is not conclusive. Hard labor is described in Article 35 of the Swiss
Penal Code77 as the strictest of the penalties restricting liberty; its dura-
tion is at least one year and at the most twenty years of life. A detention
based upon § (2) can be maintained beyond two weeks only upon spe-
cial authorization by the court bench that handles the indictment.7
Hard labor being the strictest punishment available (no death penalty
is provided for), it is clear that there are numerous kinds of violations
that are punishable with a lesser degree of restraint of freedom or with
fines.79 Consequently, probably in a vast majority of cases no arrest
order will be issued if there are no special circumstances that indicate
the danger of flight or of attempts to obstruct the inquiry.
Thus, criminal proceedings and arrest are a far cry from being identi-
cal and the temptation of handling them identically in the field of report-
ing hardly exists. This is reflected in the statutory handling of criminal
records. The basic rules on criminal records are established in the Penal
Code itself.8 0 According to the code and to the federal regulations in this
field a Criminal Register is kept by the Swiss Central Police Office with
entries concerning every person sentenced within the federal territory
76Swiss Federal Act on Federal Criminal Procedure of June 15, 1934 art. 44 AMTLICHE SA-
MMLUNG DER BUNDESGESETZE UND VERORDNUNGEN [AS] (1934). The Act is applicable only to
proceedings before Swiss Federal Courts whose jurisdiction is established either by federal legisla-
tion or through delegation to them by Cantonal legislation approved by the Federal Congress
("Assembly"). Id. arts. 7, 8. Cantonal criminal proceedings are regulated by Cantonal laws on
criminal procedure which differ considerably from one another. See Clerc, La D'Iention
Pr'ventive, 84 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR STRAFRECHT 149 (1968). Substantive criminal
law, on the other hand, is ruled by the Swiss Federal Penal Code, SCHWEIZERISCHES
STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] of December 21, 1937, as amended, AMTLICHE SAMMLUNG DER BUN-
DESGESETZE UND VERORDNUNGEN 757 (1938). Arts. 400, 401 provide for abrogation of Cantonal
penal laws on January I, 1942, the effective date of the Federal Penal Code.
7AS 764 (1938).
7sSwiss Federal Act on Federal Criminal Procedure art. 51, para. 2 AS 696 (1934).
"It is to be admitted though, that the penalty for theft is hard labor up to five years or simple
imprisonment. STGB Art. 137.
"STGB tit. 5 arts. 359-364, 62, 80. Under the authority established in art. 364 the Federal




and every Swiss citizen sentenced abroad; each Canton maintains such
a register for every person sentenced by the authorities of that Canton
and for every person sentenced who is a citizen of it. The only entries
to be registered are judgments of conviction within one month after they
have become final, paroles, and facts that cause a change of an entry.
The law provides for cancellation of entries in the record ex officio after
the expiration of nearer defined periods of time, and allows the judge
to order a cancellation of entries on request of the person sentenced if
certain conditions as to his behavior have been fulfilled and certain
minimum periods of time have expired. In cases of an especially merito-
rious behavior of the person sentenced the judge may order the cancella-
tion even before the expiration of the minimum time periods., Informa-
tion about the contents of the Register can, upon request, be given to
the judicial and other authorities of the Federation, the cantons or the
communities. No information may be given to private persons, except
that each individual can request information as to what is recorded
about himself. Information about cancelled entries may be given only
to administrative agencies that issue or revoke drivers' licenses and to
judicial authorities with regard to proceedings in which the person con-
cerned is the accused, or is subject to the execution of a punishment, to
rehabilitation, or cancellation. In these cases the fact of the former
cancellation is to be mentioned.82
B. France
In French law "provisional detention" is regulated by provisions in
force since January 1, 197 1.1 It is the rule in cases of a crime,84 "crime"
being defined as a violation of the law punishable by death, hard labor
for life, criminal imprisonment for life, hard labor for a limited time,
or criminal imprisonment for a limited time.85 In cases of a less serious
violation, "dW1it," provisional detention, may be ordered or maintained
if lighter measures of judicial supervision are insufficient and if the
possible punishment is at least two years of prison under these condi-
tions: (i) that provisional detention is the only means to preserve evi-
dence or to avoid either pressure upon witnesses or fraudulent conspir-
"STGB art. 80 as amended by Swiss Federal Act of March 18, 1971 AS 777,790 (1971).
"STGB art. 363 as amended by the Act of October 5, 1950 AS I, 14 (1951)and the Act of March
18, 1971 AS 777,802 (1971).
'C. PRO. PN. arts. 114 through 148-3 as amended by law No. 70-643 of July 17, 1970 (13e
ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1971).
"Id. art. 146.
'C. PHN. arts. I, 7 (69e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1971).
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acy between the accused and his accomplices; or (2) that the provisional
detention is necessary in order to protect the public order from interfer-
ence caused by the violation or to protect the accused, to put an end to
the violation or to prevent its repetition, or to guarantee that the accused
is available for the proceedings. 6 "D61it" is defined as a violation of the
law punishable with imprisonment of more than two months and up to
five years without considering special augmentations due to recidivism
or other factors or for other reasons, or with a fine of 2,000 francs.87
Again the result is that criminal proceedings and arrest do not coincide
at all.
The subject of criminal and related records is dealt within title VIII
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Judicial Register.""8 The
clerk of each tribunal, a rank corresponding roughly to the state supe-
rior courts in America, handles the criminal records of all persons born
within the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal. To him are reported
in the criminal field all convictions of a crime or d61it, as well as those
of mere contraventions, if the punishment provided by law is more than
ten days of imprisonment or a fine of more than 400 francs. He also
handles pronouncements of juvenile courts even if they do not amount
to a penalty in the strict sense." A similar register of criminal records
is maintained by the Minister of Justice for persons born outside
France, those whose birth certificates cannot be found, and those whose
identities are in doubt." Title VIII gives detailed directions as to the
treatment of later changes of the recorded judgments through pardon,
grace, commutation, reduction, parole amnesty, etc.91
There are three types of criminal register which can be distinguished
by virtue of how much information is to be given about the contents of
each. Register No. I comprehends the full record and can be dissemi-
nated only to judicial authorities. Register No. 2 does not include the
pronouncements of juvenile courts which do not amount to a penalty,
condemnations of persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one
years if the court in pronouncing them has expressly excluded them
from being mentioned in Register No. 2, and condemnations for police
contraventions.93 The contents of this register can be disseminated to
"'C. PRO. PN. art. 144 (13e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1971).
"TC. PN.arts. 1, 40; C. PRO PtN art. 381.










provincial governors (prifets) and to public state administrations which
deal with requests for public employment, proposals of honorable dis-
tinctions, the allotment of work or of public markets, disciplinary mat-
ters, and with the establishment of public schools; information may also
be given to certain military and electoral authorities and to those private
administrations or juridical persons listed in a special regulation for the
execution of title VIIII.94 Register No. 3 records only sentences of
imprisonment for a crime or d6lit, and indicates expressly that this is
its object. Its contents may be communicated only to the person to
whom it refers, never to a third person.95
The point of greatest importance for the topic under consideration is
the fact that nothing but judgments of conviction and no event preceding
a judgment, such as an arrest, ever enters the criminal record. Special
decrees regulate the recordings of judgments or administrative decisions
in the fields of alcoholism96 and those of traffic violations.97
C. Italy
The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure goes into great detail in
describing the prerequisites for, and modes of, interference with the
personal liberty of an individual involved in criminal activity.98 The
substance of these provisions can be summarized as follows. Arrest in
flagrante is obligatory for the police forces if the penalty for the act
committed is imprisonment for more than three years; this requirement
extends to those who have been declared habitual or professional crimi-
nals or have been subjected to security measures, to those who have been
sentenced to imprisonment before and are caught in flagrante while
committing a crime punishable with detention of not less than one year,
and finally to those who have no residence within the State.99 In these
cases a private citizen may also arrest a person caught in flagrante. °9
The police may arrest in flagrante if the crime committed is subject to
imprisonment for a maximum of not less than two years, if the malefac-
tor has been declared an habitual or professional criminal or has been
sentenced more than twice to imprisonment for an unintentional act or
111d. arts. 776, 779.
111d. art. 777.
"Decree of January 9, 1960, (13e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 371, 1971).
"1d. at 369.
"C. PRO. PN. arts. 235-94 (Hoepli 1971).
1id. art. 235 paras. I, 2. Some special violations of the Code of Public Security are also subject
to obligatory arrest by the police if the wrongdoer is caught inflagrante; TESTO UNICO DI SICU-
REZZA PUBBLICA art. 220 (Hoepli 1971).
'O"C. PRO. PIN. art. 242 para. I.
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once in the last ten years for a violation of the same type as the one in
which he is caught, or if he has no residence within the State and is
caught committing an unintentional crime the penalty for which is not
less than six months; finally arrest in flagrante is allowed, not com-
manded, for certain defined contraventions. 01
In cases other than in flagrante situations the police may make an
arrest without a warrant if two conditions are satisfied; the crime must
be strongly suspected and be one for which an arrest warrant would
otherwise be obligatory, and there must be a well-founded suspicion of
flight. "'02 An arrest warrant is obligatory where there is confirmed suspi-
cion of any of the following: (1) a crime against the State as such for
which the penalty is imprisonment for not less than five years or for a
maximum of ten years or for life; (2) a crime the penalty for which is
imprisonment for not less than five years or for a maximum of fifteen
years or for life; (3) the crime of transferring or acquiring a person who
is reduced to the status of slavery or of maintaining him in such a status;
(4) the crime of clandestine or fraudulent traffic in stupefying drugs; and
(5) the crime of counterfeiting Italian or foreign money being legal
tender in Italy or elsewhere or importing counterfeit money into Italy
or dealing with it. 0 3 Arrest warrants are optional where the crime
attributed to a person is (1) an unintentional crime the penalty for which
is imprisonment for a maximum of not less than three years; (2) an
unintentional crime the penalty for which is imprisonment of a maxi-
mum of not less than two years, if the accused had been convicted before
of an unintentional crime more than twice or had been convicted once
before for a crime of the same type, or if he has no residence within the
State or if it appears that he has fled or is about to flee; (3) an inten-
tional crime the penalty for which is imprisonment for at least two years
or not more than five years.0 4 In reaching a decision regarding such
optional arrest warrants the judge shall consider the moral qualitities
of the accused and the circumstances of the case. 05
The result of these detailed provisions is again that the field of op-
tional arrests is wide and that criminal proceeding and arrest are by no
means notions which are likely to coincide. Again, the provisions re-
garding criminal records reflect this difference. A chapter consisting of
eight articles within the fourth book of the Code of Criminal Procedure
" id. art. 236.
" id. art. 238.
"*
31d. art. 253.




dealing with the execution of judgments takes care of the topic under
the headline of "Judicial Register."'0 6 As in the French system, the
tribunals, again courts comparable in their rank to state superior courts
in America, collect and preserve extracts of certain documents referring
to persons born within their respective territorial jurisdictions; those as
to foreigners, stateless persons, citizens born abroad or those whose
birthplace is within the state but cannot be ascertained are to be pre-
served at the tribunal of Rome.'"7 As far as criminal records are con-
cerned the register contains (a) judgments of conviction as soon as they
have become irrevocable, and decrees that have become executable; (b)
judgments that have been rendered at the inquisitorial stage of the
proceedings' 8 declaring that no further prosecution is to take place if
they are no longer subject to appeal, and judgments upon trial of acquit-
tal or those blocking further prosecution, as soon as they have become
irrevocable; (c) decisions that declare a convicted person a habitual or
professional wrongdoer, and those ordering, changing or revoking secu-
rity measures.0 9
Paragraph (b) of these provisions needs to be clarified. Italian crimi-
nal procedure provides, both at the inquisitorial and trial stages, for
judgments of acquittal that can become final and unappealable. At the
inquisitorial stage such judgments mean that no further prosecution is
to take place; they are issued either by the district judge if the proceed-
ing is pending before him,. or by the inquiry judge if an inquisitorial
proceeding has been initiated before him."0 After trial the acquittal
judgment on principle effects the acquittal although in certain cases here
a pronouncement to proceed no further is also provided for."' The law
enumerates the reasons for which judgments of acquittal or pronounce-
ments to proceed no further may be rendered and requires that the
reason be expressed in the dispositive part of the sentence." 2 Among the
more important reasons enumerated are that the crime forming the
basis of the proceeding has not occurred or has not been committed by
the defendant (and in this case the judgment may specify either that
there is proof that the crime has not occurred or has not been committed
by the defendant, or that there is a complete lack of proof that the crime
has occurred or has been committed by the defendant); that the defen-




'"C. PRO. PHN. art. 604 § Ia-c.
"lId. arts. 398 para. 3, 395, 378.
"'id. arts. 478, 479.
"l2 d. arts. 378, 395, 398, 478, 479.
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dant is mentally incompetent or cannot be punished because the act
committed is not a crime; that there is insufficient proof for a judgment
of conviction (in which case the sentence specifies that it was rendered
for "insufficient proof"); that the crime is extinguished or that the
criminal proceeding should not have been started or should not have
been continued, or that in the case of a juvenile a judicial pardon is
granted. In these last two cases the sentence is always to proceed no
further."'
Thus, in Italian law there appear provisions that call in criminal
matters for the recording of judgments other than those convicting the
defendant. Some of these record entries can only improve the status of
the defendant, such as those stipulating that the crime did not occur or
has not been committed by the defendant. Others carry with them a
stigma, especially those pronouncing an acquittal because of "insuffi-
cient proof." Yet the prerequisite for any entry is always a judicial
decision either by judgment or by decree that has become final or exe-
cutable; arrests as such are not recorded.
The chapter on the judicial register also provides for certain items of
the criminal record to be removed after the running of various periods
of time,"' and sets out elaborate rules as to who can obtain information
about the contents of the register. Every authority having criminal juris-
diction may obtain for purposes of criminal justice information about
all entries in the criminal register concerning an individual. All other
public authorities and agencies that are entrusted with public services
have the same right if the information is needed for an act related to
the person to whom the information refers, with the exception of judg-
ments of acquittal of an exempted minor."5 As to requests by private
persons for information from the criminal register, the law distinguishes
between the person to whom the record refers and others; the subject
of the record is entitled to the information under any circumstances. All
other private persons may seek information only for the purpose of
presenting it in court, for purposes of the electoral process, or in hiring
for services or labor. In the request the purpose must be specified and
the legitimate interest of the petitioner must be demonstrated." 6 The
information given for electoral purposes shall not comprise any convic-
tion or other pronouncements that have no influence upon electoral








persons, two deserve some mention: certain first convictions carrying
minor penalties against persons who were less than eighteen years old
at the time of the violation; and those pronouncing somewhat higher
penalties against anyone, but as to which the sentencing judge has for-
bidden inclusion in information from the criminal register."' Finally,
the law establishes a review as to both inscriptions in the register and
information from it. Controversies on either point are decided by the
public prosecutor, the interested party having the right to recourse
through judicial review." 9 The very detailed provisions as to the judicial
register appear to be of special interest if compared with Senator
Hruska's and Representative Edwards' legislative proposals.""
D. West Germany
The law of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) as to
arrest is found in its Code of Criminal Procedure.' Less casuistic than
the Italian law, German law uses a broad and systematic approach
which is found in many of its large codifications. Provisional detention
("Untersuchungshaft") is allowed but not obligatory against a person
charged with a criminal act who is under strong suspicion of such act if
there exists a "just reason for provisional detention" ("Haftgrund");
even then, provisional detention may not be decreed if it is out of pro-
portion with the importance of the matter and the punishment or mea-
sure of security to be expected.' A "Haftgrund" exists if upon the basis
of definite facts (1) it is established that the person charged is fugitive
or is in hiding,' 2 ' or (2) after evaluating the circumstances of the indi-
vidual case there is danger that the person charged will attempt to evade
the criminal proceeding ("Fluchtgefahr")," 4 or (3) his behavior arouses
a strong suspicion that he will (a) destroy alter, remove, suppress or
falsify means of proof or (b) influences unfairly co-defendants, witnesses
or experts, or (c) induce others toward such acts, thereby rendering
more difficult the ascertainment of the truth. ("Verdunke-
lungsgefahr") 2 5 If the penalty for the violation is no more than impris-
onment for up to six months or a fine, provisional detention cannot be
decreed on the basis of "Verdunkelungsgefahr," and on the basis of
"'Id. art 608.
"1d. at 610.
'"See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
'"'STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] §§ 112-31 (Sch6nfelder, Deutsche Gesetze 1971).
'
2 STPO § 112 para. I.
'"1d. § 112 para. 2(1).
'1Id. § 112 para. 2(2).
1'Id. § 112 para. 2(3).
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"Fluchtgefahr" only if the person charged has already evaded the pro-
ceeding in question or has made preparations to flee, or if he has no
residence or domicile within the territory in which the Code of Criminal
Procedure is applicable, or he cannot identify himself.2 ' Only a few
individual crimes are singled out for special treatment. Against a person
charged with incest with a person related to him in the direct line of
kinship'27 or with a lewd act toward a minor under his supervision or
toward a person otherwise depending on him,'28 or with a homosexual
act toward a dependant minor or with mercenary homosexual behav-
ior, or with aggravated lewd acts (including statutory rape)3 0 or with
rape, '3 and who is under strong suspicion of such act, or against a
person under strong suspicion of the repetitious or continuous commis-
sion of criminal acts interfering gravely with law and order, or violence,
aggravated theft, robbery or extortion, aggravated receiving of stolen
goods, arson or certain violations of the drug laws, there also exists a
"Haftgrund"; this is also true if definite facts establish a danger that
he will commit, before final judgment is rendered, another criminal act
of the type indicated and the provisional detention is necessary to pre-
vent the existing danger.3 2 Finally, provisional detention may be de-
creed also without the presence of a "Haftgrund" in the sense of § 112,
par. 2 against a person charged with murder'33 or with voluntary
manslaugher 4 or with genocidal manslaughter,'35 if he is under strong
suspicion of such act.'36
Without a decree of provisional detention a preliminary arrest is
allowed in these cases: 1) anyone may effect the preliminary arrest of a
person found in flagrante or pursued if there is suspicion of flight, or
the arrestee's identity cannot be established immediately; 37 2) the off-
ice of the public prosecutor or police officers may also, in the case of
imminent danger, make a preliminary arrest if the prerequisites for a
decree of preliminary detention are given.' 38 In both cases the person
1261d.
121d. § 112 para. 2; Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] § 173 para. I (Schfnfelder, Deutsche Gesetze 1973).
...STGB § 174.
"Id. § 175 para. 1 (2, 3).
I-Id. § 176.
id. § 177.
...STPO § 112(a) para. I (1-2).
'"STGB § 211.
Id. § 212.
"'d. § 220(a) para. 1(1).
"'STPO § 112 para. 3.
"
71d. § 127 para. I.
"aId. § 127 para. 2.
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arrested must be brought without delay, at the latest on the day after
the arrest, before the local judge of the district within which he was
arrested; the judge decides at a hearing whether the arrestee is to be
freed or a decree of provisional detention is to be issued.'39 Elaborate
provisions regulate the proceedings in the case of provisional detention
based upon a decree, including the possibility of bail or of other mea-
sures less restrictive than actual detention, and establish the necessity
of periodic judicial re-examination of the question of maintaining the
provisional detention and the possibilities of an appeal by the person
detained from decrees ordering or maintaining the provisional deten-
tion. 40
On the basis of a decree of provisional detention the office of the
prosecutor or the judge having jurisdiction may issue an arrest warrant
if the accused is fugitive or absconds. Without a decree of provisional
detention an arrest warrant can be issued only if a person apprehended
escapes or otherwise evades his custody. Then also the police may issue
the arrest warrant.' 41
The result is that in West German law arrest is the exception rather
than the rule and that there is little danger of identifying it with a
criminal conviction. The result is reflected in the German regulations
concerning criminal records. German law in this field is, at present, in
a stage of transition; the whole law of recording has recently been
codified in the Law Concerning the Federal Central Register.' This
codification embraces criminal convictions; judicial decisions that order
or terminate guardianships for the mentally ill or retarded, for spendth-
rifts, and for alcoholics; decisions of administrative agencies regarding
the expulsion of foreigners, the denial or prohibition of practicing cer-
tain professions or trades, the denial, withdrawal or restrictions of a
passport, and the prohibition against possession of firearms and ammu-
nition; decisions in criminal proceedings dealing with the question of
mental competence of the accused; judicial decisions ordering the deten-
tion of a person because of mental illness or retardation, drug addiction
or alcoholism; follow-up decisions in these fields, all to be entered in the
so-called Central Register; and finally, certain decisions of courts and
other authorities in matters of juvenile delinquency, to be entered into
the so-called Education Register. "3
11 Id. § 128.
"1d. §§ 114-26.
"-d. § 131.
"'Law Concerning the Central Register and the Education Register (Bundeszen-
tralregistergesetz) (BZRGI of March 18, 1971 (Schonfelder, Deutsche Gesetze 1973).
13BZRG §§ 3, II, 12, 13, 14-19, 55, 56.
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The codification came into force on January 1, 197211 supplanting'45
the Law Concerning Limited Information about the Criminal Register
and the Expungement of Criminal Entries'46 and the Decree Concerning
the Criminal Register." 7 As to persons born in West Germany the
functions of the Central Register and the Education Register, and the
special tasks allotted by the codification to the Federal Attorney Gen-
eral and the Federal Minister of Justice continue to be carried out until,
at the latest, December 31, 1976 by the authorities handling them under
the old law; however, the Federal Minister of Justice with the consent
of the Bundesrat may order that these functions or special tasks pass
to the Federal Central Register, the Federal Attorney General and the
Federal Minister of Justice at an earlier date. 4' Because of the transi-
tional character of the old Law and Decree the treatment of the subject
here will be limited to the law of the codification which, because of its
elaboration, shall be dealt with in some detail.
The Federal Central Register is maintained in Berlin, administered
by the Federal Attorney General who is attached to the Federal Su-
preme Court. As far as records in criminal matters are concerned there
is no provision for recording arrests (provisional detention). A search
notice or a notice about an arrest warrant'49 may be deposited by a duly
qualified authority at the Register; 5 ° if the Register carries any entry
or receives any communication regarding the person involved, the de-
positing authority is notified of the date and identification number of
each entry and of the authority from which the communication origi-
nated. 5' In the case of arrest warrant inquiries coming from several
authorities each one is notified by the Register of the inquiry of the other
inquiring authority or authorities,'52 and each inquiring authority is also
informed about any incoming request for a Certificate of Conduct or
for information about the entries in the Register. 5 It should be empha-
sized that in spite of the provisions just mentioned the search or arrest
warrant notice is not a regular entry in the Register. As a matter of
procedure this result from the fact that the subject of these notices is
11id. § 71 para. 1.
1111d. § 71 para. 2.
'Law of April 9, 19201 RGBI 507.
'
47Decree of June 12, 1920 [1920] Central Bulletin for the German Empire 909.
14 BZRG § 71 para. 3.
"'See text accompanying note 141 supra.
-1BZRG § 25.
'
111d. § 26 para. I cl. 1.
'Wd. § 26 para. 2.
1s31d. § 26 para. I cl. 2.
[Vol. 4:i116
CRIMINAL RECORDS
dealt with in a special title of the Bundeszentralregistergesetz, apart
from the one whose headline is "Contents and Keeping of the Regis-
ter."' 54 As to the substantive aspect the Register authority is to be
notified should the inquiry become moot, perhaps through finding the
person looked for, or through withdrawal of the order of arrest; in any
case, the notice about the inquiry is to be eliminated from the Register
at the latest upon expiration of three years following its inclusion.,5" This
indicates clearly that this type of notice reflects in no way upon the
character of the person involved but rather serves for a limited time only
the sole purpose of aiding the authoritities to locate him.
The substantive entries in the Register have been outlined above.5 6
In the field of criminal records final judgments that are no longer sub-
ject to ordinary appeals are to be entered if they contain a conviction
and pronounce a penalty, or if they indicate any measure of security or
reformation or the sentence of a juvenile or young adult under postpone-
ment of the infliction of a juvenile penalty in accordance with the law
on juvenile jurisdiction. Convictions for a contravention punishable only
through a fine are not to be entered.'57 The entry includes principal and
subsidiary penalties," 8 such as the revocation of a drivers' permit and
the period of time for which it is revoked, 19 as well as any probation,
and parole, pardon or amnesty affecting the penalty, and follow-up
decisions concerning penalties or their mitigation; the expiration date
of a sentence involving imprisonment or any restriction of liberty is also
to be recorded.'""
The duty of notification is reciprocal. The courts notify the Register
of all decisions, statements or facts that are subject to entry in the
Register.'' If the Register contains any entries about any type of miti-
gation of a penalty still subject to revocation, then the Register has to
inform the source of such entries of any new penalties recorded, of the
granting of mitigation in another case, or of the receipt of an inquiry
for search or arrest. In case a mitigation is revoked and the Register
contains an entry of mitigation in another case, it informs the source of
the other mitigation of that revocation."2 In this way a high degree of
'
5 BZRG Part I ("The Central Register") tit. 3 ("Notices about Warrants of Arrest and Search
Notices") as compared with Part I tit. 2 ("Contents and Keeping of the Register").
'
5
'BZRG § 27, paras. 1, 2.
"See text accompanying note 143 supra.
11BZRG § 4, paras. I, 2.
"Ild. § 5 para. 1(5).
1591d. § 9.
" ld. at 17.
---d. § 20.
"l21d. § 21 paras. 1-3.
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certainty is established that every authority concerned with criminal
records is constantly kept abreast of any of actual change and even
possible changes, the first sign of which could be an inquiry for a search
or an arrest warrant.
Other titles deal with the expunction of entries from the Register 6 '
and with the general rules regulating information about the contents of
the Register.'64 Entries of convictions are with few exceptions6 5 to be
expunged after the expiration of terms which run, according to the type
and length of the penalty meted out, from five to fifteen years.'66 In
exceptional cases, the Federal Attorney General may, either upon a
petition or ex officio, order the record expunged, contrary to the general
provisions, of certain entries if the penalty has been fully paid or served
and no public interest would be violated by such order. The individual
concerned may appeal a denial of such petition within two weeks to the
Federal Minister of Justice.6 7 The Register itself expunges entries con-
cerning persons whose death has been reliably reported or those who are
more than ninety years old. 68 If the entry concerning conviction has
been expunged or is to be expunged, neither the underlying facts nor the
conviction itself can be raised in legal matters regarding the individual
concerned nor can they be used against him, although the rights of third
persons are not interfered with.6 9
In disseminating information about the contents of the Register a
distinction is drawn between a so-called Certificate of Conduct, 170 and
Unrestricted Information about the Register. 7' Anyone over fourteen
years of age may himself or through his legal representative apply for a
certificate about the contents of the Register as to his person (Certificate
of Conduct). The application is to be made at the local police office
where the residence of the applicant is registered,'7 2 which office must




The exceptions are imprisonment for life, security confinement, confinement in a mental
institution and judgments permanently barring an individual from being issued a driver's license.
Id. § 43 para. 3.




1111d. § 49 paras. 1, 2. As an exception, the crime may be taken into consideration if the security
of the Federal Republic of Germany or Lnder absolutely requires such an exception, Lnder





1721d. § 28 paras. I, 2.
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person other than the applicant. 7 ' If he applies for it with the purpose
of presenting it to some public authority it is to be sent to this authority
which must allow the applicant to see it if he so desires. However, the
applicant may ask the Register to send the certificate, if it contains any
entries, to a local court of the applicant's choice rather than directly to
the public authority. After inspection by him the local court forwards
the certificate to the public authority or, if the applicant objects to this,
destroys the certificate.174 In exceptional cases, a public authority may
obtain a Certificate of Conduct directly if it is needed for conducting
its official functions and a request directed to the person concerned is
either inappropriate or unavailing; again, the person concerned must be
allowed to see it first if he so desires.'75 These provisions secure a high
degree of privacy and permit the applicant to detect any mistake in an
entry without, on the other hand, being able to alter the certificate
before it reaches the public authority in question. The Certificate of
Conduct does not include notices of search or orders of arrest deposited
with the Register, nor does it list certain minor convictions; most major
convictions are no longer listed after the expiration of a term between
three to five years. However, in most cases, as long as one conviction is
still to be mentioned in the Certificate of Conduct all listed convictions
are to be mentioned.' 6 In exceptional cases the Federal Attorney Gen-
eral may allow further exclusions from the Certificate of Conduct under
rules similar to those described above as to expunction of an entry."
Entries not to be listed in the Certificate of Conduct, as well as notices
of search or an order of arrest deposited with the Register, are included
in the so-called Unrestricted Information about the Register, to be given
only to the courts and offices of the public prosecutor for judicial pur-
poses, to the central offices of the Federal Government and to the
Government Linder, to the police offices concerned with criminal mat-
ters for the purposes of prevention and prosecution of crimes, and to
several other authorities for the purpose of their special services. The
Unrestricted Information is to be issued only upon express request and
if it contains entries not to be listed in a Certificate of Conduct this must
be indicated.' 8 Such entries can be forwarded by the central authorities
to their subordinate authorities only in special cases of an urgent public
'"Id. § 28 para. 4.
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interest.'79 Generally, any type of information about the Register can be
given only to the public servants entrusted with the receipt and handling
of the matter in question.'
In two cases the Federal Attorney General can allow information to
be given beyond those entries that go into the Certificate of Conduct.
A person older than fourteen years or his legal representative may be
allowed information about whether the Register contains such entries
if he demonstrates a justified interest in this. Further, the Federal Attor-
ney General may allow that Unrestricted Information about the con-
tents of the Register may be given for scientific studies if the importance
of the study justifies this and if there is assurance that no abuse is to be
feared. Even then the names of the persons concerned can be revealed
only if the study cannot be carried out without this.'8 '
Finally, the law endeavors to clear up the dilemma that exists in
American law of how far the person convicted has to reveal his past.
The German law provides as follows:
Duty of Disclosure of a Person Convicted.
1) A person convicted is allowed to denote himself not convicted and
he need not disclose the facts underlying a conviction if the conviction
is either
1) not to be entered into the Register, or
2) not to be listed in the Certificate of Conduct or
3) to be expunged.
2) In so far as courts or other authorities are entitled to Unrestricted
Information the person convicted cannot avail himself, with regard to
such courts or authorities, of the privilege based upon paragraph 1)
No. 2 if he has been advised of this.18 2
The law does not deal expressly with the question of whether a private
stipulation or renunciation can do away with the rights just described.
However, the nature of the provisions as part of public law and their
elaborateness both as to the general extent of the privilege and as to its
one important restriction make it sufficiently clear that they cannot be
changed through private stipulation or renunciation.
Conclusion
There is in the United States a need to balance the interest of the
public in the apprehension and conviction of criminals with that of
179/d. § 41.
'-Id. § 42.




individuals arrested but not convicted of any wrongdoing. As has been
shown, some of the leading civil law countries have approached this goal
in two ways: first, by not requiring an arrest in a great number of
criminal cases and thus not furthering in the mind of the public the idea
that arrest and criminal wrongdoing are identical, and second, by con-
fining entries in criminal records, at least on principle, to final convic-
tions of criminal violations. The recent West German codification of the
law of criminal records appears to be striving for the greatest perfection
both through concentration of criminal records and limitation of their
availability only to those public authorities in serious need of them as
well as to the person to whom the record refers; this protects at the same
time his right to privacy as to his criminal record and also his right to
its accuracy.
It is not suggested here that a complete and immediate shift to the
systems described is the adequate solution of the dilemma in American
law, but some moves in the right direction may be advisable. The lack
of any reliable information in America about the change of residence is
possibly an obstacle against making a formal arrest a rare exception
rather than the general rule. Yet more and more a summons to the
police station for interrogation should be substituted for an arrest in the
frequent cases either where the expected penalty is small or where family
or employment circumstances make it improbable that the accused
would become unavailable in the further proceedings. 3
To use an arrest in itself as an item suitable for a criminal record is
an anchronism that shifts to the accused the burden of proving his
innocence; this ought to be changed to the more civilized method of
recording convictions rather than arrests. For purposes of finding or
identifying a living or deceased person one could consider making fin-
"'
3See n. I supra. In England this trend is clearly visible. Under § I(1) of the Magistrates' Court
Act of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & Eliz. 2 c.55, the justice of the peace may, upon an information
laid before him, issue either a summons requiring that the accused person appear before a magis-
trates's court to answer the information or a warrant to arrest that person and bring him before a
magistrates' court. However, according to § 24 of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967, c. 80, a
warrant for arrest of any person seventeen years or older shall not be issued under § I of the
Magistrates' Court Act unless the offense is an indictable offense, i.e., an offense which if commit-
ted by an adult, is triable on indictment (§ 125 Magistrates' Court Act) or is punishable by
imprisonment, or unless the address of the defendant is not sufficiently established for a summons
to be served on him. Arrest without warrant is regulated in § 2(l) of the Criminal Law Act of
1967, c. 58, which introduces the term of arrestable offense and provides: "The powers of summary
arrest conferred by the following subsections shall apply to offenses for which the sentence is fixed
by law or for which a person (not previously convicted) may under or by virtue of any enactment
be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years, and to attempts to commit any such offence:
and in this Act, including any amendment made by this Act in any other enactment, 'arrestable
offence' means any such offence or attempt."
1974]
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gerprinting compulsory for everyone reaching an age at which finger-
lines are sufficiently developed. This would hardly be a greater intrusion
into privacy than the present widespread use of fingerprints or of Social
Security numbers. A central archive of fingerprints for the whole popu-
lation, combined with one of modernized criminal records and notices
of search or of arrest warrants would be both more effective and more
humane than the present system.
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